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Figueroa-Beltran v. United States, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 45 (Jul. 16, 2020)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW: SEPARATE CONVICTIONS FOR SIMULTANEOUS POSSESSION 
UNDER DRUG TRAFFICKING STATUTES  
 
Summary 
 
In answering the rephrased certified question from the Ninth Circuit, this Court 
ultimately concluded that a substance’s identity is an element to the crime articulated in NRS 
453.377. Because the statute was determined to be ambiguous, the Court relies on the holding in 
Muller and Andrews to support the conclusion that the units of prosecution are charged as a 
separate offense for each controlled substance simultaneously possessed. Therefore, the statute 
establishes multiple, separate offenses for each controlled substance that is identified.  
  
Facts and Procedural History 
 
 Gibran Richardo Figueroa-Beltran (“Figueroa-Beltran”) is a native of Mexico who was 
unlawfully residing in the United States. In 2012, Figueroa-Beltran was convicted for possession 
of a controlled substance with intent to sell in violation of NRS 453.3372 for simultaneously 
possessing heroin and cocaine. He was sentenced to 19–48 months in prison but was paroled 
approximately one year later. Upon his release, he was again arrested for selling a controlled 
substance and then removed to Mexico. Following his removal, Figueroa-Beltran illegally 
reentered the United States. Still unlawfully residing in the United States, he was newly arrested 
for selling a controlled substance.  
 
In federal court, Figueroa-Beltran pleaded guilty to unlawfully residing in the United States 
after a previous deportation.3  He was sentenced to 41 months in prison by way of a 16-level 
sentencing enhancement based upon his 2012 conviction. Such an enhancement may be imposed 
if the defendant had a previous drug trafficking conviction which resulted in a prison sentence of 
more than 13 months.4 Under the federal sentencing guidelines, a drug trafficking offense is 
defined as “an offense under . . . state . . . law that prohibits . . . the possession of a controlled 
substance (or a counterfeit) with intent to . . . distribute, or dispense.”5 Figueroa-Beltran appealed 
to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to challenge the application of the 16-level enhancement and 
argued that his conviction under NRS 453.337 did not qualify as a drug trafficking offense under 
the federal sentencing guidelines.  
 
To determine if the prior conviction under NRS 453.337 qualifies as a drug offense under 
the federal sentencing guidelines, the Ninth Circuit conducts a three-step analysis6: 
 
 
1  By Jorge “Coco” Padilla.  
2  NEV. REV. STAT. § 453.337 
3  8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012). 
4  U.S. SENT’G COMM’N (U.S.S.G.) §  2L.1.2. 
5  U.S.S.G. §  2L1.2, comment. (n.1)(B)(iv)(2015).  
6  United States v. Martinez-Lopez, 864 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2017).  
1. Categorical Match. The court must determine if the state law prohibits the same or less conduct 
than the federal drug trafficking offense. If so, then the two offenses are a categorical match and 
the 16-level enhancement applies. Here, the Ninth Circuit found that there are more criminalized 
substances identified in the schedules in NRS 453.337 than in the federal Controlled Substances 
Act. Therefore, the state and federal offenses are not a categorical match.  
 
2. Is the state statute divisible? After finding a state statute is not a categorical match to its federal 
counterpart, the Court must classify the statute as divisible or indivisible. A statute is divisible 
when the statute defines various versions of committing an offense. In the alternative, a statute is 
indivisible if the statue defines multiple versions to satisfy only one element of the offense.  
 
3. Modified Categorical Approach. If the state statute is found to be divisible, the Court applies 
the modified categorical approach. In essence, the Court determines the statutory language that 
was the basis for the conviction.  
 
 The Ninth Circuit established that NRS 453.337 is not a categorical match to its federal 
counterpart but was not able to determine whether the state statute was divisible or indivisible.  
The Circuit found no controlling Nevada precedent which classified a substance’s identity as an 
element of the offense articulated in NRS 453.337. A finding of a substance’s identity as an 
element would assist the Ninth Circuit in determining if the state statute is divisible. As a result, 
the Ninth Circuit filed certified questions with the Nevada Supreme Court.  
 
Discussion 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court is permitted to accept and answer certified questions from the 
Ninth Circuit but shall limit its answer to the question of law certified by the Ninth Circuit.7 The 
court does not determine the facts, they merely accept the facts found in the certification order 
from the Circuit Court. Although the Ninth Circuit certified three questions, the court has 
discretion to rephrase the certified questions. The court used its discretion to reframe the questions 
into a single question because the state criminal laws have not experienced the federal concept of 
divisibility. The reframed question: Is the identity of a substance an element of the crime 
articulated in NRS 453.337? 
 
Defining elements for purpose of this inquiry 
 
 First, the Court outlined the difference between an element of a crime and the facts for 
committing the crime. Elements are defined as the parts of a crime which the prosecution must 
prove to sustain a conviction and what the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt to convict a 
defendant.8 On the other hand, facts are defined as having no legal effect or consequence and must 
not be found by the jury nor admitted by the defendant.  
 
 The Court illustrated two examples to differentiate between a divisible and indivisible 
statute. The first example is through a hypothetical in Mathis. The hypothetical supposes that a 
statute lists the use of a deadly weapon as an element of a crime. The statute provides that a knife, 
 
7  NRAP 5.  
8  Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2245, 2248 (2016).   
gun, bat, or similar weapon will satisfy this element. The Court outlines that, because the statute 
lists different ways of satisfying the deadly weapon element, the jury must not identify the specific 
weapon which was used. The jury merely needs to conclude that a deadly weapon was used. Hence, 
the statute is indivisible as for the use of a deadly weapon.  
 
 The second example uses an analysis of a burglary statute. The example supposes that a 
burglary statute requires (1) entering (2) a structure (3) with the intent to commit a felony therein. 
To sustain a conviction, the prosecution must prove the three elements to this crime. Supposing 
the statute further defines “entering” to include entry by force, threat, or invitation. These 
classifications of entering are not elements of the statute but rather provide a means to satisfy the 
entry element and would thus be indivisible. By contrast, the Court illustrates if the statute were 
to prohibit entry into a building or automobile. The statute would create two distinct ways of 
committing the same burglary offense— by entering a building or by entering an automobile. Thus, 
this statute would be divisible.  
 
 The Court used these two examples to conclude that the purpose of the Ninth Circuit 
certified question was to determine if the Legislature meant for the state statute to create multiple 
ways to commit one single offense or multiple, separate offenses. Here, Figueroa-Beltran argues 
that the identity of a controlled substance is merely a means of committing a crime and not an 
element. He argues that the state must not prove the particular controlled substance which he 
possessed, but just that he possessed a controlled substance. Similar to the first example, Figueroa-
Beltran is saying that it does not matter if the jury concluded that he possessed heroin or cocaine, 
but only that they can conclude that he possessed a controlled substance.  
 
NRS 453.337 is ambiguous 
 
 Statutory interpretation will determine whether the identity of a substance is an element of 
the offense. To understand the Legislature’s intent, the Court will first look at the plain language 
of the statute.9 If the language is clear and unambiguous, the statute will be enforced as written. 
However, if the statute can be interpreted in more than one way, the Court will look past the plain 
language and will consider the spirit, subject matter, public policy, and legislative history.  
 
 The Court found that the statute is ambiguous. Under the NRS 453.337(1) language, “it is 
unlawful for a person to possess for the purpose of sale . . ., any substance which . . . is an 
immediate precursor or any controlled substance classified in schedule I or II.” (emphasis added). 
The term “any” makes the statute ambiguous. The “any” term can determine how many times a 
defendant violates NRS 453.337 for simultaneously possessing different substances. Also known 
as the unit of prosecution. The Court finds that the “any” term is ambiguous when it relates to unit 
of prosecution because it can be interpreted in many variations. In the past, the Court in Castaneda 
v. State10 held that the “any” term was used as “a” so to mean that simultaneously possessing 
multiple photos of child porn was considered as only one offense. 
 
 
9  Williams v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 133 Nev. 594, 596, 402 P.3d 1260, 1262 (2017). 
10  132 Nev. 434, 438, 373 P.3d 108, 111 (2016).  
However, the Court previously determined in Andrews v. State11 that the “any” term, as 
applied to Nevada drug trafficking statutes, created separate offenses for the simultaneous 
possession of two different substances. In Andrews, the Court reasoned that the Nevada Uniform 
Controlled Substances Act (UCSA) referenced to controlled substances in the singular which 
indicated the “any” term to create separate offenses for the simultaneous possession of different 
substances.  
 
Because the Court found that the “any” term was reasonably interpreted in more than one 
way in Castaneda and Andrews, the Court concluded the statute is ambiguous and must look 
beyond the plain language.  
 
Caselaw indicates the substance’s identity is an element of the crime described in NRS 453.337 
 
 There is minimal legislative history that indicates the Legislature’s intent to classify the 
substance’s identity as an element of the crime articulated in NRS 453.337. The Court 
acknowledged the State’s argument that because the Nevada Legislature modeled the statute from 
the California possession-for-sale statute, which has been supported by the California Supreme 
Court to impose multiple convictions for the simultaneous possession of different controlled 
substances. However, the Court held that California precedent does not apply to the question 
presented because the Nevada Legislature did not adopt the identical language from the California 
statute. Thus, this Court looked to persuasive caselaw to determine if a substance’s identity is an 
element of the crime articulated in NRS 453.337.  
 
 The Court referenced to its decision in Muller v. Sherriff12 which indicates the use of a 
substance’s identify as an element of NRS 453.321. Pierre Muller made a simultaneous sale of 
heroin (schedule I) and cocaine (schedule II) and was charged with the two corresponding offenses. 
Although the defendant argued that he sold the two controlled substances simultaneously and 
should only classify as one offense, the Court explained that each sale required the identity of the 
controlled substances sold. 
 
 The Court then returned to the reasoning in Andrews to explain how NRS 453.3385(1) 
imposes different penalties based upon the quantity of the controlled substance possessed or sold. 
The penalty for possessing 4 grams but less than 14 grams of a schedule I controlled substance is 
1-6 years in prison, whereas the penalty for possessing 14 grams but less than 28 grams is 2-15 
years in prison. In Andrews, the defendant possessed 9 grams of heroin and 9 grams of 
methamphetamine, both schedule I controlled substances. The Court sentenced the defendant 
based upon the fact that he had 14 grams of controlled substances after combining both substances’ 
quantities. Andrews established the unit of prosecution to the identity of the substance, meaning 
that the identify of a substance is an element of the crime.  
 
 The Court identified that NRS 453.570 requires the type of controlled substance to be 
identified at trial for offenses in violation of NRS 453.011 to 453.552. The fact that a witness must 
identify a controlled substance at trial means that the substance’s identity is an element of the crime 
articulated in NRS 453.337. Additionally, the Court concluded that the identity of a substance will 
 
11  134 Nev. 95, 99, 412 P.3d 37, 40 (2018).  
12  93 Nev. 686, 687, 572 P.2d 1245, 1245 (1977).  
determine its classification under the schedules of controlled substances and its corresponding 
punishment. The Court reasoned that the identification of the controlled substance is necessary to 
determine which specific provision has been violated depending on the type and quantity of such 
substances.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 This Court holds that a substance’s identity is an element of the crime articulated in NRS 
453.337 in their response to the Ninth Circuit’s certified questions.  
 
 
Dissent 
 
Stiglich, J., with whom Pickering, C.J., agrees, dissenting: 
   
 The two justices found that the plain language of NRS 453.377 does not include the 
controlled substance’s identity as an element because the identity of a particular substance satisfies 
the element of any controlled substance. They justified this reasoning with the fact that if one of 
the controlled substances were to be removed from the schedule I or II, the statute would not 
change.  
 
 They stated that although the plain language is sufficient to answer the question posed, the 
justices take issue with the majority’s reliance on unit-of-prosecution caselaw and Muller. At the 
time that Muller was decided, the two controlled substances, heroin and cocaine, were identified 
in separate statutes, which have sense been repealed. The defendant was charged with the two 
separate offenses because the controlled substances were listed in two separate statutes. Today, the 
controlled substances are not listed in separate statutes, but rather they are classified on a schedule 
of substances as determined by the Board of Pharmacy and supported by the administrative code. 
The deletion of the particular controlled substances in the statutes indicates that the identity of the 
substance is not an element of the crime articulated in NRS 453.337. 
 
 Additionally, Justice Stiglich took issue with the majority’s reliance on Andrews because 
there she argued that NRS 453.3385 does not make a distinction between the different substances 
and neither should the Court. She applied the plain language interpretation in this case because the 
statute does not create a distinction which establishes the identity of a substance as an element.  
 
 Lastly, the dissent disagreed with the majority’s idea that the identity of a substance will 
determine its classification under the schedules of controlled substances and its corresponding 
punishment, but rather asserted that it is the weight that determines the punishment.  
 
